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Abstract. Growing interest in using personality variables in economic research
has led to the question whether personality as measured by psychology is useful
to predict economic behavior. It is undoubted that personality can influence
large-scale economic outcomes. Whether personality variables can also be used
to understand micro-behavior in economic games is, however, less clear. We
discuss the reasons for and against this assumption. In the framework of our
own experiment, we test whether and which personality factors are useful in
predicting behavior in the Trust Game. We can also use the Trust Game to
understand how personality measures fare relatively in predicting behavior when
situational constraints are strong or weak. This approach can help economists
to better understand what to expect from the inclusion of personality variables
in their models and experiments, and where further research might be useful
and needed.
Keywords: Personality, Big Five, Five Factor Model, Incentives, Experiment,
Trust Game.
JEL-Classifications: C72, C91, D03.
E-mail addresses: Julia.Mueller@wiwi.uni-muenster.de.
Date: April 5, 2017.
Corresponding author: Julia Mu¨ller, University of Mu¨nster, Institute for Organisational Eco-
nomics, Scharnhorststr. 100, 48151 Mu¨nster, Germany.
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Ulrike Basten, Christian Fiebach, and Christine
Stelzel for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the START-Professorship
of the University of Heidelberg of the DFG Initiative of Excellence is gratefully acknowledged.
1
PERSONALITY IN EXPERIMENTS 1
1. Introduction
Recently, a growing interest among (behavioral) economists in personality
variables can be observed (e.g. Rustichini, DeYoung, Anderson, and Burks, 2012;
Mu¨ller and Schwieren, 2012; Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz, 2011;
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2010; Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and
ter Weel, 2008). Very frequently, the Big Five personality factors are used. Usually,
correlations of the personality measures with some real-world aspects of economic
behavior are reported and interpreted, for example with earnings or performance
on the job.1
Research in experimental economics has started to include personality mea-
sures in experiments, hoping to be able to explain part of the behavioral hetero-
geneity found. Many studies relate some kind of Big Five personality variable,
although measured by different instruments, to behavior in games like the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, Dictator Game, or the Ultimatum game (e.g. Brandsta¨tter and
Gu¨th, 2002; Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong, and Magan, 2004; Ben-Ner, Kong, and
Putterman, 2004; Swope, Cadigan, Schmitt, and Shupp, 2008). Another example
is Zhao and Smillie (2015), which examines the impact of personality in two spe-
cific economic games (a social dilemma and a bargaining game) by using the Big
Five and the HEXACO personality framework.2
Other studies use more specific scales, such as the Locus of Control, Self-
Monitoring, and Sensation Seeking (Boone, De Brabander, and Van Witteloost-
uijn, 1999), or the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (Schmitt, Realo, Voracek, and
Allik, 2008). The results of these exercises so far are not very conclusive.
One reason for this might lie in a methodological concern: is it reasonable to
expect scores on personality scales to be predictive of micro-behavior in economic
games? It is undoubted that personality can influence economic outcomes in the
large (Ozer and Benet-Mart´ınez, 2006), such as occupational attainment (Filer,
1985) or occupational performance and success (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Seibert
and Kraimer, 2001). Whether personality variables can also be used to understand
“micro”-behavior in economic games is however less clear.
In this paper, we discuss reasons for and against the assumption that person-
ality variables can help to explain “micro”-behavior in economic games. Therefore,
in our own experiment, we test whether personality factors are useful in predict-
ing behavior in the Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995). We can
1See for example Barrick and Mount (1991); Mueller and Plug (2006).
2The HEXACO model of personality belongs to the group of general measures as defined in
Section 2. The acronym HEXACO stands for Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion,
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience.
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also use the Trust Game to understand how personality measures fare relatively
in predicting behavior when situational constraints vary in strength.
There are other studies relating the Trust Game or trust in general to per-
sonality. Two studies relate the Machiavellian personality test to the Trust Game:
Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, and Smith (2002) use a modified trust game and Burks,
Carpenter, and Verhoogen (2003) the standard trust game. Having hypotheses
about both trust and trustworthiness, related to scoring high on Machiavellism,
Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, and Smith (2002) find that subjects who score high
on Machiavellism are less trustworthy, where Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen
(2003) find that a high score on Machiavellism predicts a lack of trust, but not
trustworthiness.Thielmann and Hilbig (2015) find evidence that participants in an
online trust game who score high on Honesty-Humility in the HEXACO model
of personality act in a way that is more trustworthy. Fahr and Irlenbusch (2008)
use the Big Five personality model, measured by Catell’s 16 PF-R, in an analysis
of trust between representatives of organizations, using a modified trust game.
To implement their organizational setting, the subjects played in groups of four
and had to decide on a representative of their own group. They found a link be-
tween anxiety and trustor behavior and anxiety and cooperative behavior on the
side of the trustee. The research focus of Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) is on
understanding trusting and trustworthiness. They use many different measures,
and among others the Big Five factors (measured by the NEO-FFI). Regarding
the definition of trust and trustworthiness, they use not only survey questions but
also a modified trust game (a repeated variant).
To preview our experimental results, we can show that the behavior of Player 1
is more strongly determined by personality than the behavior of Player 2. We dis-
cuss this result on the background of our aims, to get an idea of when personality
matters and whether and how using personality as an additional explanatory vari-
able is recommendable for (experimental) economists.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we give
an overview of the literature on personality measurement. Then, we describe our
experimental design and procedure in Section 3 and in particular the personality
measures used (Section 3.4) in more detail. In Section 4, we present our hypotheses
regarding the relation between behavior and personality. In Section 5, we describee
our results. First, the main findings about the general behavior of Players 1 and
2 in the Trust Game are summed up (Section 5.1). Section 5.2 then presents the
results regarding the influence of personality and Player 1’s behavior and Section
5.3 those for Player 2. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes.
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2. The Measurement of Personality
Personality psychology provides a large set of specific measures of potential
interest for economists. On the one hand, there are general models of personality,
usually having between four and seven general factors of personality (e.g. Goldberg,
1981; Cloninger, Svrakic, and Przybeck, 1993; Cattell and Schuerger, 2003). These
are measured with different scales, varying in the content of the factors and the
sub-factors measured. The most famous example is the NEO-PI-R, which measures
the so called Big Five Personality Factors (Costa and McCrae, 1992). On the other
hand, there are more specific measures, capturing certain aspects of personality,
such as anxiousness or aggressiveness. Here, we focus on the general measures and
use the NEO-PI-R (Costa and McCrae, 1992), German version (Ostendorf and
Angleitner, 2004) to measure the Big Five personality factors.
Researchers in personality psychology have discussed whether personality fac-
tors can be expected to correlate strongly with real life outcomes and behavior,
and whether it would be problematic if this was not the case. After Mischel (1968),
many personality psychologists have argued that there is a ceiling of a correlation
of 0.3 between personality variables and real life outcomes, the so called 0.3 bar-
rier (Mischel (1968); see also McCrae (1982) for exceptions). Researchers that
adhere to this ceiling argument put forward the idea that the situation is at least
as important as personality, or even more important, in determining behavior and
important life outcomes.
Others (e.g. Ozer, 1985), however, argue that 0.3-correlations are not that
small and can have important practical effects and that most social, psychological
(and even medical) variables, such as socioeconomic status or cognitive ability,
do not, on average, correlate any more strongly with important life outcomes. It
is noteworthy that usually the outcomes studied are larger-life outcomes, such as
divorce, occupational or educational attainment, and not “micro”-behaviors, such
as trust-game behavior. An exception to this is research in organizational behavior
that links, for example, the locus of control or conscientiousness to individual
performance, turnover decisions, etc. (e.g. Judge and Bono, 2001; Allen, Weeks,
and Moffitt, 2005; Dudley, Orvis, Lebiecki, and Cortina, 2006).
Most researchers argue that personality influences outcomes in life not in a
direct way, but rather by affecting general tendencies to act, e.g., to continue an
education or to be persistent despite failures, which then influences the develop-
mental path over the life span. An example from the economic literature of such
an indirect influence is Fre´chette, Schotter, and Trevin˜o (2014), who find that in
a risky context where all parameters are known to the subjects, personality traits
other than risk attitude do not have predictive power, whereas in an uncertain
4 PERSONALITY IN EXPERIMENTS
setting, personality parameters do play a direct and indirect role in determining
decisions.
We therefore do not expect to be able to explain behavior in the Trust Game
by a single personality factor. We do however think that if personality has indeed
an influence on behavior, it should at least contribute somewhat to an explana-
tion of small-scale behavior, especially when the situation does not provide much
guidance on how to behave.
3. Experimental Design and Procedure
First, we describe the procedures of the experiment in subsection 3.1, followed
by an explanation of the structure of the experiment in subsection 3.2. Next, we
will outline the Trust Game (subsection 3.3) and eventually elucidate the Big Five
personality model (subsection 3.4).
3.1. Procedures. The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory
of SFB 504 in Mannheim. In all, 138 subjects participated (57 male, 70 female,
the remaining did not indicate their gender).
3.2. Structure of the Experiment. In this paper we report part of the data
collected in a large experiment. All subjects came three times to the labora-
tory. There were two experimental sessions with one week in between, and a third
individual appointment for the personality questionnaires (separate from the ses-
sions).3 The Trust Game was implemented in the second experimental session.
All subjects participated in two sessions with one week in between. The
experiment consisted of 24 independent sessions, 12 in the first and 12 in the
second week. In all, the experiment lasted for approximately one hour in the first
and one hour in the second week. Approximately one week before starting the
experimental sessions, the subjects filled out the personality questionnaires, which
took them about two hours. The personality questionnaires were administered
on paper, the games were programmed and conducted with the software “z-tree”
(Fischbacher, 2007).
The subjects were carefully informed about the time schedule in advance. At
the beginning of each session, they received instructions containing the course of
events of the specific session by the experimenter for each game and decision. The
3For filling out the personality questionnaires, the subjects did not have a fixed appointment,
but they could drop by at the laboratory at three different given days between 9 am and 6 pm
to individually fill out the questionnaires. We used a seminar room adjacent to the laboratory
and a student assistant stayed the whole day in the room to hand out the questionnaires and to
monitor the subjects.
PERSONALITY IN EXPERIMENTS 5
instructions were distributed and read aloud. The participants could ask questions
if they did not understand parts of the instructions4.
We paid subjects at the very end of the experiment, i.e., after completing all
sessions in the second week. The earnings were determined by two factors. On
the one hand, the subjects’ earnings in the experiment depended on the decisions
(of the subject and their partner(s)) in the games, and on the other hand, the
participants could generate earnings thanks to flat fees.5 All the subjects were
paid individually, in cash.
3.3. The Trust Game. The players were randomly assigned to be either Player 1,
the trustor, or Player 2, the trustee.6
The players were randomly sorted into pairs. Both players of each pair got
ten units of an experimental currency (abbreviated “ECU” in the following). The
trustor could first decide whether or not to send ECU to Player 2. If Player 1 sent
x units (0 < x ≤ 10), these units were tripled. Then Player 2 was informed about
the amount received and could decide to send an amount y (0 ≤ y ≤ 3x) back to
Player 1 (these units were not tripled). Therefore, the payoffs for both players are
determined by
Player 1 : 10− x + y Player 2 : 10 + 3x− y.
At the end of the experiment, the experimental currency was transformed into
Euro at an exchange rate of 1 ECU = 0.3e.
3.4. The Big Five. To measure personality, we use the five-factor model or the
Big Five (Goldberg, 1981; McCrae and Costa JR, 2003). This model organizes
personality traits along five basic dimensions: neuroticism, extraversion, openness
to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.7 A list of the personality
dimensions and their definitions measured by the Big Five model can be found in
Figure 1.
To implement the Big Five personality model, we use the NEO PI-R (Costa
and McCrae, 1992), German version (Ostendorf and Angleitner, 2004). It consists
of 241 items which have to be rated on a 5-point Likert scale.
4The full instructional material for the Trust Game can be found in Appendix A.
5The participants received a one-time payment of e14 for filling out the personality question-
naire and in each of the two sessions an appearance fee of e5.
6We used neutral wording for the Instructions and avoided words like “trust.”
7There are other labels for the five factors; we use the labels in Costa and McCrae (1992).
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Figure 1. The five factors of the Big Five Model (NEO-PI-R)
Neuroticism: Neuroticism refers to the emotional stability of a person. It
points to “individual differences in the tendency to experience distress”
(McCrae and John, 1992, p. 195).
Extraversion: Extraversion mainly measures to what extent someone is
emotionally positive. There has been a broad discussion about how to
describe extraversion. Spontaneity, energy, and assertiveness, as well as
dominance, confidence, and a tendency towards happiness, are often eval-
uated as being part of extraversion (Carver and Scheier, 2008, p. 54).
Openness: There has been some discussion about the factor “openness to
experience.” Different labels have been favored to capture the content of
this factor. Some prefer the label “intellect” (Goldberg, 1981). Others
argue that “openness to experience” would be the best label, as this label
also includes important aspects such as “creativity, differentiated emotions,
aesthetic sensitivity, need for variety and unconventional values” and does
not focus only on items such as intelligent or “imaginative and perceptive”
(McCrae and John, 1992, p. 197). In this paper, the label “openness” will
be used.
Conscientiousness: Conscientiousness tries to capture an individual’s “will
to achieve” (Carver and Scheier, 2008, p. 55). This factor combines two as-
pects. On the one hand, it includes the behavior “governed by conscience”
and on the other hand it refers to the behavioral patterns of being “diligent
and thorough” (McCrae and John, 1992, p. 197).
Agreeableness: Agreeableness indicates to what extent someone is “con-
cerned with the maintaining of relationships” (Carver and Scheier, 2008,
p. 54). If someone scores high on this factor, it includes “characteristics
such as altruism, nuturance, caring and emotional support” (McCrae and
John, 1992, p. 196).
4. Hypotheses
The reason to select the Trust Game for our research is that it contains two
different situations (for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively) that can be described
in terms of a distinction often made in personality psychology: the distinction
between weak and strong situations (Mischel, 1977). In weak situations, the be-
havioral triggers stemming from the situation are weak, and therefore personality
variables can contribute significantly to an explanation of behavior. In contrast,
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in strong situations, the situational triggers of behavior are strong and therefore
personality variables might not contribute much to an explanation of behavior.
The situation of Player 2 in the Trust Game is clearly determined. Player 1
has either trusted him with a certain amount of money or not, so that he has to
decide how to react to Player 1’s behavior. As is known from the experimental
literature, reciprocity is a norm prevailing in this context (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe, 1995; McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith, 1998; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000;
McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith, 2003). Player 1 however faces a situation where the
norms or guidance for behavior are less clear. The player’s personality, especially
the tendency to trust or not, will have an important influence on the decision on
how much money to send to Player 2.
Hypothesis 1. The first players find themselves in a rather weak situation, there-
fore personality variables can contribute to explain their behavior. The second
players are in a rather strong situation. Therefore, personality variables will not
contribute much to an explanation of their behavior.
In the following we will explain further hypotheses regarding the behavior of
both players during the Trust Game and to what extent the Big Five personality
model might be able to explain behavioral differences. In addition, we rely on the
literature, mainly in personality psychology, to predict which personality factors
should be most important for the explanation of the behavior of Player 1 and of
Player 2 in the Trust Game.
First, we derive hypotheses for the link between personality factors and be-
havior, i.e., we discuss in what way a subject with a certain personality will behave
in the Trust Game.8
Neuroticism refers to the tendency to experience negative emotions and feel-
ings, especially anxiety and general distress. Therefore, we expect that a person
scoring high on neuroticism to be rather anxious and to avoid the risk of not get-
ting money back. Thus, we expect a negative relation between the first player’s
sending and neuroticism.
Hypothesis 2. The higher the score of Player 1 on neuroticism, the lower the
amount sent.
With respect to extraversion and openness to experience, we do not have any
hypotheses regarding the behavior in the Trust Game. Spontaneity and openness
might favor both outcomes, i.e., to trust or to distrust, so that we do not make
any assumptions about the impact of these two factors on the behavior.
8For further details regarding the Big Five personality model and for definitions of the factors,
see Figure 1.
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Agreeableness is defined as being compassionate and cooperative. Two im-
portant facets among others of Agreeableness are Trust (A1) and Altruism (A3).9
There is an intuitive appeal to supposing that agreeableness and trusting behav-
ior are linked and that Altruism (A3) might be connected with the behavior of
the trustee. However, in the present paper, we focus on analyzing only the main
factors. There has been a broad discussion in the literature about motives other
than trust that are involved in trust game behavior; Cox (2004) points out that
not only trust and trustworthiness, but also altruistic preferences can account for
the sending behavior of Player 1 and the reaction of Player 2.
To sum up, agreeableness is often linked to cooperative behavior (Volk, Tho¨ni,
and Ruigrok, 2011; LePine and Van Dyne, 2001). This leads to the following
intuitive hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The higher the score of Player 1 on agreeableness, the higher the
amount sent by Player 1. Likewise, a higher score of agreeableness of Player 2 will
lead to a higher relative amount returned by Player 2.
People scoring high on conscientiousness prefer to be well organized and to
plan activities in advance rather than being spontaneous; they are dutiful and self-
disciplined. Therefore we suppose that high levels of conscientiousness will lead
to higher amounts sent by Player 1 (being dutiful) if a norm for sending is salient.
As conscientiousness is also linked to rationality (D’Zurilla, Maydeu-Olivares, and
Gallardo-Pujoi, 2011; Witteman, van den Bercken, Claes, and Godoy, 2009), high
levels of conscientiousness could, however, lead as well to lower amounts being
sent by Player 1 (being more rational). Hence, high levels of conscientiousness
of Player 1 could reinforce effects in both directions, sending more and sending
less. For Player 2, we assume the norm of reciprocity to be salient and thus,
controlling for Player 1’s sending behavior, we expect trustors that score high
on conscientiousness to follow this norm dutifully, and thus return money in a
reciprocal way.
Hypothesis 4. Higher levels on conscientiousness of Player 1 could lead to more
or less sending. Referring to Player 2, we assume that high scores on conscien-
tiousness lead to higher relative amounts returned.
5. Results
The results section is divided into three parts. We begin with a brief descrip-
tion of the players’ general behavior in the Trust Game (subsection 5.1), followed
9See Appendix B.2 for the factors of the Big Five model and its facets.
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by a presentationof the results concerning personality and the behavior of Player 1
(subsection 5.2). Eventually, we point out the main results regarding personality
and the behavior of Player 2 (subsection 5.3).
5.1. Behavior in the Trust Game. In our experiment, there were 60 subjects
playing the Trust Game in the role of Player 1, and the average amount sent by
Player 1 was 4.3 ECU (of the 10 ECU). This is slightly below what is usually re-
ported. The usual results are that Player 1 sends on average half of his endowment
and this trust is not fully repaid by Player 2 (e.g. Camerer, 2003). The average
amount returned by Player 2 was 5.9 ECU, and it is strongly correlated with the
amount sent (r = 0.736).
Johnson and Mislin find in their meta-study of 162 replications of the Trust
Game that an increase in trust of Player 1 by sending more money to Player 2
is rewarded by an increase in trustworthiness, meaning Player 2 also sends back
more money. But if the amount of money sent by Player 1 is not tripled but only
doubled, the proportion of money Player 2 is willing to return decreases less than
proportionately (Johnson and Mislin, 2011).
Table 1. Correlations between x, the amount sent by Player 1, and
the personality factors
x N E O A C
N −0.339 1.000
0.139
E −0.052 −0.331 1.000
1.000 0.166
O 0.199 −0.102 0.404∗ 1.000
1.000 1.000 0.025
A 0.284 −0.071 0.146 0.133 1.000
0.462 1.000 1.000 1.000
C −0.259 −0.211 0.233 0.010 −0.078 1.000
0.752 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively. Abbreviations: x = amount sent by Player 1,
N = neuroticism, E = extraversion, O = openness to ex-
perience, A = agreeableness, C = conscientiousness
5.2. Personality Measures and Trustor Behavior. Generally, we find rea-
sonable variance in our personality scales.10 Scores on all five of the personality
measures are normally distributed (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normality).
10For descriptive statistics of the personality scales, see Table 5 in Appendix B.1.
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To analyze the impact of personality on the first player’s behavior, we first
calculate the correlations between the amount sent by Player 1 and the five per-
sonality factors. Table 1 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients. We correct for
multiple testing using Bonferroni corrections.11
Table 1 also shows the intercorrelations of the personality factors. Only open-
ness and extraversion are marginally positively correlated. We cannot draw any
conclusions from the correlation analysis about the influence of personality on the
behavior of the first player.
For evidence on how personality influences the first player’s behavior, we
focus on a regression analysis of the amount sent by Player 1. Table 2 presents the
results from an OLS regression. The dependent variable is x, the amount sent by
the trustor to the trustee. For the trustor, we explain the amount sent using the
Big Five personality model: we use the five factors and test individually whether
they influence the behavior of the first player.
Table 2. Regression on x, the amount sent by Player 1
variable beta SE p-value
neuroticism − 0.474** 0.025 0.001
extraversion − 0.300* 0.027 0.035
opennness 0.232 0.027 0.073
agreeableness 0.264* 0.023 0.028
conscientiousness − 0.311* 0.019 0.014
age − 0.146 0.104 0.211
gender 0.075 1.025 0.592
R2 0.373
adj. R2 0.286
This table shows the coefficients (2nd column), standard errors (3rd column) and p-
values (4th column) from an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the amount
sent by Player 1. Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
The regression on the amount sent by Player 1 (see Table 2) clearly shows a
significant influence of some of the five factors on the first player’s behavior, namely
of neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness and consientiousness. Neuroticism has
the strongest negative impact, followed by conscientiousness, which also has a
significant negative impact on the amount sent. Agreeableness has a significant
positive impact. Concerning openness, no significant influence was found. The
11Using Sidak corrections instead of Bonferroni does not change our results.
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regression model explains 28% of the variance in the amount sent by the first
player.
Considering these main results, we can confirm our hypothesis 2 referring to
the impact of neuroticism, and hypothesis 3 referring to the influence of agreeable-
ness. In line with hypothesis 2, the regression affirms that first players scoring high
on neuroticism tend to send less money, as the beta value is significant and nega-
tive (−0.474∗∗). Regarding the behavior of Player 1, the results of the regression
support hypothesis 3. As the beta value is significant and positive (0.264∗), the as-
sumption that first players scoring high on agreeableness tend to send more money
is verified. Extraversion and openness were the two factors whose influence we did
not predict, as they might reinforce behavior in either direction. Our regression
makes clear that openness does not have any influence at all. However, extraver-
sion does impact the behavior of the first players: the higher their score, the less
money they are willing to send (beta value −0.299∗). Hypothesis 4 left open what
kind of influence conscientiousness might have on the first player’s behavior. The
results of our regression give an answer about the direction of influence of this
factor. As the beta value is significant and negative (−0.311∗), we find evidence
that the higher the score of the first player on conscientiousness, the less money
is sent.
To sum up, our regression model confirms our previous hypotheses regarding
Player 1 and gives clear evidence that personality factors do influence the first
player’s behavior, meaning that in weak situations, personality does matter and
affect behavior.
5.3. Trustee Behavior. We now turn to the behavior of the second player. As
described before, there is one clear difference between predicting the first player’s
behavior and predicting the second player’s behavior: the behavior of Player 2 is
most likely to be guided by reciprocal incentives, i.e., what the first player has sent
to the second player will matter. We thus have a strong situation here, as opposed
to the weak situation in which the first players find themselves. In line with the
general search for interactions of personality variables with the environment in
personality psychology, our main question is whether personality variables predict
something beyond the “material,” situational characteristics, or whether it is only
Player 1’s behavior that predicts the responses of Player 2.
We start with the correlations. We report the Pearson correlation coefficients
in Table 3 (again corrected for multiple testing by Bonferroni corrections, using
Sidak corrections does not change our results). If we take the data of all the
trustees, the only, but highly significant, predictor of Player 2’s behavior is the
amount Player 1 sends (0.731, p = 0.000). We find no correlation at all between
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Table 3. Correlations between y, the amount returned by Player 2,
x the amount sent by Player 1 and the personality factors
y x N E O A C
x 0.731∗∗∗ 1, 000
0.000
N −0.021 0.000 1, 000
1.000 1, 000
E 0.127 0.077 −0.266 1.000
1.000 1.000 0.878
O 0.193 0.125 0.123 0.333 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.210
A −0.009 0.117 −0.203 0.166 0.020 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
C −0.046 −0.165 −0.297 0.144 −0.120 −0.006 1.000
1.000 1.000 0.472 1.000 1.000 1.000
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively. Abbreviations: y = amount returned by Pl. 2,
x = amount sent by Pl. 1, N = neuroticism, E = extraver-
sion, O = openness to experience, A = agreeableness, C =
conscientiousness
the behavior of Player 2 and any of the personality factors, i.e., the situation
determines the behavior more decisively than do the personality variables.
These main findings confirm our hypothesis 1, that if players find themselves
in a strong situation, as the second players do, personality factors do not matter
for explaining behavioral differences. In strong situations, the situation itself, in
this case the amount Player 1 was willing to send to Player 2, is the only aspect
having a significant influence on the behavior. However, as mentioned before, if
players find themselves in a weak situation, as the first players do, personality
factors do contribute greatly to explaining the behavioral differences.
This conclusion is well supported by the results of the regression on the
amount returned by Player 2 (see Table 4). These results again highlight that
only the amount that Player 1 has sent to Player 2 contributes to an explanation
of the amount Player 2 returns (the beta value of trust offer is significant: it is
0.762∗∗∗).12
12Sometimes it is argued that one should only analyze those second players that received
positive amounts from the first player, because players receiving zero are forced to return zero.
Repeating our analysis only with subjects that received strictly positive amounts, we find that
the results are structurally identical to those shown in Table 4.
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Table 4. Regression on y, the amount returned by Player 2
variable beta SE p-value
amount sent by Pl. 1 0.762*** 0.173 0.000
neuroticism 0.0007 0.030 0.995
extraversion 0.057 0.031 0.598
opennness 0.104 0.042 0.308
agreeableness − 0.100 0.036 0.309
conscientiousness 0.080 0.035 0.417
age − 0.0001 0.283 0.999
gender − 0.055 1.450 0.597
R2 0.601
adj. R2 0.536
This table shows the coefficients (2nd column), standard errors (3rd column) and p-
values (4th column) from an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the amount
returned by Player 2. Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
According to the results of the regression (see Table 4), parts of hypothesis 3
and hypothesis 4 have to be rejected, referring to the second players. Neither the
level of the scores of agreeableness nor the level of the scores of consientiousness
have a significant impact on the behavior of the second players. As noticed above,
the only factor having a significant influence is the situational condition (in this
case, the amount of money Player 2 received from Player 1), as the second players
face a strong situation.
6. Discussion
To answer the question to what extent personality can contribute to explain
small-scale economic behavior, we employed the Trust Game as an example. Our
main finding is that for players who find themselves in a weak situation, person-
ality variables do contribute significantly to explain their behavior. Contrarily,
personality factors do not have predictive power for the behavior of players facing
a strong situation.
Our study had two main aims: First, we wanted to test whether personality
variables can be used to predict “micro”-level behavior in economic games, where
we use the example of the Trust Game. Next, we hypothesized that strong situa-
tions allow less influence of personality factors than weak situations, and that the
first players in a Trust Game are in a weak situation, while the second players face
a strong situation.
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Our results confirm most of our general and some of the more specific hy-
potheses. First, we do find that personality variables contribute to an explanation
of behavior. Trustor behavior can be explained to a large extent using personality
variables. This is good news especially for personality psychologists, who so far
have seldom validated their personality scales with the help of clear-cut behav-
ioral experiments. It is also good news for all those experimental and behavioral
economists that are now beginning to use personality measures in their exper-
iments. But, we have also confirmed the notion of strong and weak situations
found in personality psychology: The first player’s behavior can be explained to
a large extent (up to 28% of the variance) using personality variables, while the
second player’s behavior is explained by the situation. This is in line with the find-
ing of Fre´chette, Schotter, and Trevin˜o (2014), that personality does not correlate
with behavior in a risky decision, but does correlate with behavior in ambiguous
decisions. This is essentially good news for standard economics, as this means that
if incentives or behavioral norms are clear and strongly point in a specific direction,
most people, independently of their personality, will react to these incentives, and
predictably so.
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Appendix A. The Trust Game
Instructions. These instructions have been translated into English from the orig-
inal German.
In this game you will play together with one other person in the laboratory.
You are either Player A or Player B. This will be randomly determined by the
computer. The other person (A or B) with whom you will play will also be
randomly assigned by the computer.
Both Player A and B receive 10 experimental currency units (ECU). Player A
can decide whether she would like to send any ECU to Player B and if so, how
many (only integer amounts are possible). The amount of ECU that Player A
sends to Player B is tripled. Consequently, Player B receives three units for each
unit sent by Player A. Afterwards, Player B decides whether he wants to return
any ECU to Player A and if so, how many. These units will not be tripled. This
is the end of the game.
The experimental currency is converted into Euros as follows: 1 ECU = 0.30
Euro.
If you have any questions regarding these instructions, please raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will come to answer your questions.
Appendix B. The Big Five Personality Model
B.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Personality Scales. In Table 5 the descrip-
tive statistics of the Big Five personality model are displayed.
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of the Personality Scales
Variable n Mean SD Min Max
Neuroticism 126 91.985 23.666 27 155
Extraversion 126 116.020 21.564 32 158
Openness 126 124.478 16.781 72 180
Agreeableness 126 109.925 18.700 67 152
Conscientiousness 126 116.294 21.636 58 166
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B.2. Factors and Facets. In Table 6 the five factors and the names of all facets
are summarized.
Table 6. Names of the Factors and Facets





N6 Vulnerability to Stress


















C Conscientiousness C1 Competence
C2 Order
C3 Dutifulness
C4 Achievement-Striving
C5 Self-Discipline
C6 Deliberation
